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Should the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands be classified as Islands or Rocks? An Examination 
in Light of the South China Sea Arbitration Award 
Introduction 
In July 2016, an Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea1 (UNCLOS) handed down its award in the South China 
Sea dispute between the Philippines and China.2 In addition to considering the legal status of 
the controversial nine-dash line, the Tribunal also provided the first judicial interpretation of 
Article 121 of UNCLOS, thereby shedding light on what maritime features may be regarded 
as islands and not rocks within the meaning of that article and therefore entitled to an 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and a continental shelf. This paper considers the decision 
reached by the Tribunal with respect to Article 121 of UNCLOS, and the views expressed in 
literature, applying them to an analysis that attempts to answer whether the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands (sovereignty over which is disputed by China and Japan) in the East China Sea would 
qualify as islands and thus entitled to an EEZ and a continental shelf or as rocks and not so 
entitled. This paper will begin with a description of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute, 
followed by a consideration of the meaning of Article 121 as expressed in literature and an 
analysis of the decision of the Tribunal. This analysis is then applied to the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands dispute. This paper argues that on the basis of the South China Sea dispute award, 
these maritime features, although referred to as islands, are more likely to be considered as 
rocks and consequently, not entitled to an EEZ and a continental shelf within the 
                                                          
1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 
1994) 1833 UNTS 396. 
2 The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v The People’s Republic of China) PCA Case 
No 2013-19 (2016) available at https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-
Award.pdf. 
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contemplation of Article 121. However, the non-satisfactory interpretation given to Article 
121(3) of UNCLOS by the Tribunal may affect the value of the award as a guide for future 
cases. 
The Diaoyu/Senkaku Island Dispute 
The dispute over title to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is a major feature of the East China Sea 
maritime boundary dispute. China and Japan have tried unsuccessfully for decades to agree 
on where the maritime boundary should lie in the East China Sea, a marginally enclosed sea 
bounded by the Yellow Sea in the North, the South China Sea in the South, the Japanese 
Kyushu and Ryukyu Islands in the East and the Chinese mainland in the West. The East 
China Sea dispute principally concerns how to delimit the continental shelf (and by 
extension, the EEZ) of the East China Sea when the disputing parties, China and Japan, rely 
on the different criteria in Article 76(1) of UNCLOS, namely natural prolongation and 
distance, to assert entitlement to the continental shelf. Entangled in this delimitation problem 
is the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands which involves not only sovereignty 
over the Islands but also what maritime zones they are entitled to.3  
The Island group is made up of 8 tiny insular formations—5 islets and 3 barren rocks. 
Together, they have a combined land area of less than 7 square kilometres.4 All of them are 
uninhabited and there is no evidence of human economic activity on them.5 While the three 
                                                          
3 J Guoxing, ‘The Diaoyudao (Senkaku) Disputes and Prospects for Settlement’ (1994) 6(2) Korean Journal of 
Defense Analysis 285-311, at p.285; C Park, ‘Oil Under Troubled Waters: The Northeast Asia Sea-Bed 
Controversy’ (1973) 14(2) Harvard International Law Journal 212-260, at p. 248. 
4 C Manjiao, ‘The Unhelpfulness of Treaty Law in Solving the Sino-Japan Sovereign Dispute over the Diaoyu 
Islands’ (2011) 6 University of Pennsylvania East Asia Law Review 163-189, at p.164. 
5 S Su, ‘The Tiaoyu Islands and Their Possible Effect on the Maritime Boundary Delimitation between China 
and Japan’ (2004) 3(2) Chinese Journal of International Law 385-420, at p.387. 
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largest islets have some vegetation, the others are barren. They possess no intrinsic value and 
are only desired because of the petroleum that they might deliver to whichever State has title 
to them.6 The dispute over ownership of these Islands arose in the late 1960s after a report 
following a UN study indicated that there was a high probability that a substantial volume of 
hydrocarbons were located in the seabed around these Islands.7 Until this time, the seabed 
had lain undisturbed and it was the report on the presence of hydrocarbons that marked the 
beginning of the oil war.8 The report, authored by the Committee for Coordination of Joint 
Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore Areas (CCOP), founded in 1966 under 
the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 
(ECAFE), described the continental shelf of the East China Sea as probably ‘one of the most 
prolific oil reservoirs in the world’.9 In view of this, the States in the area concerned 
immediately began to assert claims to sovereign rights over the continental shelf so as to take 
                                                          
6 J Donaldson and A Williams, ‘Understanding Maritime Jurisdictional Disputes: The East China Sea and 
Beyond’ (2005) 59(1) Journal of International Affairs 135-156, at pp. 135–36; H Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku 
Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., R.O.C., and Japan 
(University of Maryland School of Law, Baltimore, 1999) 11. 
7 S Su, ‘The Territorial Dispute over the Tiaoyu/Senkaku Islands: An Update’ (2005) 36 Ocean Development & 
International Law 45-61, at p.47. 
8 Park (n 3), at pp. 212–13; Y Ma, ‘The East Asian Seabed Controversy Revisited: Relevance (Or Irrelevance) 
of the Tiao-Yu-T’al (Senkaku) Islands Territorial Dispute’ (1982) 2 Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of International 
Law and Affairs 1-44, at p.2; S Lee, ‘Territorial Disputes among Japan, China, and Taiwan Concerning the 
Senkaku Islands’ in Shelagh Furness and Clive Schofield (eds), Boundary and Territory Briefing, vol 3 
(International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham, 2002) 6. 
9 S Kim, ‘Understanding Maritime Disputes in Northeast Asia: Issues and Nature’ (2008) 23(2) International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (IJMCL) 213-248, at p. 238. Ma (n 8), at p.4. 
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advantage of the hydrocarbon resources of the seabed.10 As the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands sat 
atop the ‘prolific oil reservoir’, title to them would prove to become a very important factor.  
At the time of the report, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were still being administered by the 
Government of the United States pursuant to the UN trusteeship system established under the 
1951 Treaty of Peace entered into at San Francisco by Allied Powers with Japan to mark the 
official end of the Second World War.11 Although the Treaty does not mention the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands,12 they, nevertheless, came under United States’ administration, and 
there is no evidence of China contesting this until the Islands were returned to Japan as part 
of Okinawa under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty.13 However, at this time, the report on the 
potential hydrocarbon resources of the seabed of the East China Sea had just been released 
and with the prospect of gaining title to the hydrocarbon resources, the States bordering the 
East China Sea moved to declare their continental shelf claims. China and Taiwan thus 
challenged the legitimacy of the transfer of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to Japan along with 
Okinawa under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty.14 
Since the United States’ reversion, however, Japan has been in occupation of the Islands 
while China continues to lay claim to them. The United States has itself maintained a neutral 
                                                          
10 Park (n 3), at p.213. 
11 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, etc. Treaty of Peace with Japan (with two declarations).  8 
September 1951; available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20136/volume-136-I-1832-
English.pdf. 
12 M Manyin, ‘Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations’ (Congressional Research 
Service 2013) R42761 3, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42761.pdf. 
13 Su (n 7) at p. 47. 
14 S Lee, ‘The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan and the Territorial Disputes in East Asia’ (2002) 
11(1) Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 63-146, at p.91. 
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stance regarding the territorial dispute, stating that its return of the administrative rights over 
the islands to Japan does not add any legal rights to those possessed by Japan before the 
transfer of administration to the United States nor does it diminish the rights of other 
claimants, making the matter one for resolution between the parties concerned.15 In spite of 
this, Japan has refused to acknowledge the existence of a dispute over the Islands and has 
accordingly refused to enter into negotiations with China on the issue.16 Furthermore, Japan 
has used the Islands as base points for the construction of its unilateral median line;17 this 
median line represents Japan’s position on delimitation of the East China Sea. While China 
claims that the Islands are not entitled to an EEZ or a continental shelf, Japan holds that they 
are entitled to an EEZ and a continental shelf and by using them as base points for the 
construction of its median line,18 has given them full effect.19 Thus, this territorial dispute 
stands in the way of effective resolution of the maritime delimitation dispute.  
                                                          
15 Manyin (n 12), at p.5. 
16 J Gao, ‘Joint Development in the East China Sea: Not an Easier Challenge than Delimitation’ (2008) 23(1) 
IJMCL 39-75, at p. 62. 
17 M Valencia, ‘The East China Sea Dispute: Context, Claims, Issues, and Possible Solutions’ (2007) 31(1) 
Asian Perspective 127-167, at p. 154; Gao (n 16), at p.62. 
18 Valencia, (n 17), at p. 154. 
19 Although it was held in the Qatar v. Bahrain case that ‘islands, regardless of their size...enjoy the same status, 
and therefore generate the same maritime rights, as other land territory’ ([2001] ICJ Rep 40, 97, para 185), 
islands have generally been considered as relevant circumstances to be taken into consideration and weighed 
along with other relevant circumstances during a delimitation exercise in order to arrive at an equitable solution. 
In view of this, islands may, in the drawing of the final line, be ignored, given reduced effect or full effect. For a 
table of cases setting out the effect given to islands, see Yoshifumi Tanaka, Predictability and Flexibility in the 
Law of Maritime Delimitation, (Hart Publishing, Portland, 2006) 280. See Chapter 7 for discussions in this 
regard. 
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China and Japan had seemingly shelved the territorial dispute in 1972 when diplomatic ties 
were established between the two States. However, when in April 1978, 100 Chinese fishing 
vessels entered into the 12-mile territorial sea (then newly declared by Japan) asserting 
sovereignty over the Islands and defying Japan’s demands to leave the area, the once shelved 
territorial dispute was revived.20 A number of other incidents have aggravated the dispute.21 
In September 2010, a Chinese fishing boat collided with two Japanese coast guard vessels 
near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.22 Japan detained the captain of the Chinese fishing vessel 
and even though he was subsequently released, bilateral relations between China and Japan 
deteriorated.23 Two years after this incident, in September 2012, Japan made the decision to 
nationalise three of the five main islets belonging to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island Group.24 This 
nationalisation which costs the Japanese Government 2.05 billion yen ($26.1 million) again 
                                                          
20 Y Ma, Legal Problems of Seabed Boundary Delimitation in the East China Sea  (Occasional Papers/Reprints 
Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Baltimore, 1984) at pp.1–2. 
21 For a chronology of important events relating to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, see Lee (n 8), at pp.6–8. 
22 J McCurry, ‘Japan-China Row Escalates over Fishing Boat Collision’ (the Guardian, 9 September 2010) 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/09/japan-china-fishing-boat-collision. 
23 P Smith, ‘The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Controversy : A Crisis Postponed’ (2013) 66(2) Naval War College 
Review 27-44, at p.28; S Kim, ‘China and Japan Maritime Disputes in the East China Sea: A Note on Recent 
Developments’ (2012) 43(3) Ocean Development & International Law 296-308, at p.296; T Branigan, ‘China 
Cuts Japan Contacts over Detained Trawler Captain’ (the Guardian), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/19/china-japan-contacts-detained-trawler-captain; ‘Boat Collisions 
Spark Japan-China Diplomatic Row’ (BBC News, 8 September 2010), available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11225522. 
24 J Perlez, ‘China Accuses Japan of Stealing Disputed Islands’ (The New York Times, 11 September 2012), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/world/asia/ch ina-accuses-japan-of-stealing-disputed-
islands.html. 
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intensified the dispute, with protests and demonstrations straining the already strained 
relationship between the two States.25 
In addition to this question of title to the Islands, which this paper does not address, there is 
also the question of whether the Diaoyu/Senkakus are islands within the meaning of Article 
121 of UNCLOS and therefore entitled to an EEZ and a continental shelf. It is this question 
that this paper is concerned with and which is dealt with in subsequent sections, specifically 
in light of the award in the South China Sea Arbitration where the Tribunal took on the task 
of interpreting Article 121 of UNCLOS. The answer to this question might impact on the 
delimitation dispute in the sense that if the Diaoyu/Senkakus are seen to be rocks rather than 
islands, then what is to be gained from having title to them will be marginal (just 12 nautical 
miles compared with 200 nautical miles if they were to be classed as islands), and attention 
may turn to the delimitation dispute involving the main territories of the disputing States, 
hopefully making its resolution easier. In beginning the analysis, the next section considers 
the regime of islands in Article 121 of UNCLOS. 
Islands and the Law of the Sea 
The legal regime governing islands is provided for in Article 121 of UNCLOS. Paragraph 1 
of Article 121 defines an island as ‘a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, 
which is above water at high tide.’ Under paragraph 2, an island is entitled to a territorial sea, 
a contiguous zone, an EEZ and a continental shelf as any other land territory. In the Qatar v. 
Bahrain case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that Article 121(2) of UNCLOS, 
which reflects customary international law, entitles ‘islands, regardless of their size, in this 
                                                          
25 Smith (n 23), at p.27. 
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respect [to] enjoy the same status, and therefore generate the same maritime rights, as other 
land territory.’26 
As an exception to the rule in Article 121(2) that entitles islands to EEZs and continental 
shelves, Article 121(3) provides that rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or 
economic life of their own are exempt from possessing EEZs and continental shelves. It is 
inferred then that rocks may be entitled to a territorial sea and a contiguous zone.27 At this 
point, the important question arises as to which maritime features fall into the category of 
islands generating EEZ and continental shelf entitlements and which ones fall into the 
category of rocks not entitled to extended maritime spaces. Also, is it accurate to speak of 
rocks entitled to an EEZ and a continental shelf when they are found to satisfy the conditions 
in Article 121(3), or is it sufficient (since rocks are not defined anywhere in UNCLOS) for 
the purposes of deciding whether a particular feature is entitled to an EEZ and a continental 
shelf, to regard as rocks, a naturally formed area of land, which though surrounded by water 
and standing above water at high tide cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of its 
own (that is a kind of island but one not entitled to an EEZ and a continental shelf)?28 
Although these questions have arisen with respect to interpreting Article 121(3), the most 
                                                          
26 [2001] ICJ Rep 40, at para 185 
27 J Charney, ‘Rocks That Cannot Sustain Human Habitation’ (1999) 93(4) American Journal of International 
Law (AJIL) 863-878, at p.864. 
28 For a discussion on the possible meaning of ‘rocks’ as used in Article 121(3), see B Kwiatkowska and A 
Soons, ‘Entitlement to Maritime Areas of Rocks Which Cannot Sustain Human Habitation or Economic Life of 
Their Own’ (1990) 21 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 139- 181, at pp.151–53; J Van Dyke and D 
Bennett, ‘Islands and the Delimitation of Ocean Space in the South China Sea’ (1993) 10(1) Ocean Yearbook 
Online 54-89, at pp.77–79; G Xue, ‘How Much Can a Rock Get? A Reflection from the Okinotorishima Rocks’ 
in M Nordquist and others (eds), The Law of the Sea Convention: US Accession and Globalization (Nijhoff 
2012) 341-368, at p.355. 
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important question, for the purposes of this paper, is how the phrases, ‘sustain human 
habitation’ and ‘economic life of their own’ should be defined. This because it is these 
phrases that are instructive for coming to a decision as to whether or not a particular maritime 
feature would be entitled to an EEZ and a continental shelf.  
The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands stand above water at high tide, making it necessary to consider 
if they fulfil the conditions in Article 121(3). Since the phrases, ‘sustain human habitation’ 
and ‘economic life of their own’, are not defined in UNCLOS, it is easy to agree with the 
assertion that paragraph 3 of Article 121 is laconic,29 and susceptible to a number of different 
meanings that States may exploit to their advantage.30 The proper interpretation to be given to 
Article 121 has thus plagued the minds of scholars for a long time, especially as no judicial 
pronouncement had been made until the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration Award. It is 
proposed to consider these opinions before considering the South China Sea Award in 
determining whether to classify the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands as islands or rocks. This 
                                                          
29 R Smith and B Thomas, 'Island Disputes and the Law of the Sea: An Examination of Sovereignty and 
Delimitation Disputes' in C Schofield and A Harris (eds) Maritime Briefing 2(4) (International Boundaries 
Research Unit, Durham, 1998) 1-27 at p. 2; Su (n 5), at p.393; Charney (n 27), at p.863; C Schofield, ‘The 
Trouble with Islands: The Definition and Role of Islands and Rocks in Maritime Boundary Delimitation’ in S 
Hong and J Van Dyke (eds), Maritime Boundary Disputes, Settlement Processes, and the Law of the Sea 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2009) 19-38, at pp.25–26; Kwiatkowska and Soons are of the opinion that 
it difficult to glean the meaning of Article 121 either from the general context of other provisions in UNCLOS 
or from the travaux preparatoires. They also note that in light of the legislative history of Article 121, the value 
of any consensus reached regarding the maritime spaces of Islands is to be questioned. See Kwiatkowska and 
Soons (n 28), at pp. 141–142. 
30 A Alexopoulos, ‘The Legal Regime of Uninhabited Islets and Rocks in International Law - The Case of the 
Greek Seas’ (2003) 56 Revue hellénique de droit international 131-151, at pp.149–50. 
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consideration will also contribute to understanding whether the Award aligns with the views 
expressed in literature. 
Article 121(3) in the Literature 
In considering the interpretation to be given to Article 121(3) of UNCLOS, Van Dyke and 
Brooks state that in view of the technological advancements of the present day, any rock may 
be made inhabitable if the State that has title to it so desires.31 Ma equally notes that any rock 
may be made economically viable with or without resources from its territorial sea.32 Indeed, 
Charney is of the opinion that a casino may be built on a naturally formed area of land 
surrounded by water, and the revenue generated from the casino could be used to purchase 
necessities from external sources, and that this would go towards satisfying the condition of 
ability to sustain economic life of its own, thereby taking the area out of the classification of 
rocks and entitling it to generate an EEZ and a continental shelf.33 He also sees the possibility 
of regarding the resources of the territorial sea surrounding these areas as contributing to the 
satisfaction of the condition. Charney thus concludes that ‘Article 121(3) ought to be 
                                                          
31 J Van Dyke and R Brooks, ‘Uninhabited Islands: Their Impact on the Ownership of the Oceans’ Resources’ 
(1983) 12(3-4) Ocean Development & International Law 265-300, at p.267. See also R Hodgson and R Smith, 
‘The Informal Single Negotiating Text (committee ii): A Geographical Perspective’ (1976) 3(3) Ocean 
Development & International Law 225-259, at p.231. Hodgson and Smith opine that ‘[a]ny rock could support 
human habitation if the state was willing to spend enough money; for example, a rock with a lighthouse built 
upon it sustains human habitation by external expenditure of funds by the state, which gives the rock an 
economic life of its own in its value to shipping, ocean sports, and so forth.’ 
32 Ma (n 8), at p.30. 
33 Charney (n 27), at p. 871. 
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interpreted to permit the finding of an economic life as long as the feature can generate 
revenues sufficient to purchase the missing necessities.’34 
On the other hand, Su opines that the words, ‘economic life of its own,’ mean that the 
economic resources of the island must come from the island itself and not be extraneous to it. 
He argues that ‘economic activity for that purpose, in the spirit of Article 121(3), must be 
conducted on the rock or have an intimate link to the resources of the rock.’35 Ma, agreeing 
with Su, emphasises the object of Article 121(3), arguing that to take a broad view in 
interpreting the paragraph (and he specifically uses the casino example) would be to take a 
view that defeats the object or purpose of the exception to paragraph 2 that paragraph 3 
creates. For Ma, under the assumption of the application of a strict interpretation to paragraph 
3, a rock’s ‘own economic life should be supported by the resources on the rock proper alone, 
not including those in its territorial sea or brought from outside.’36 Therefore, making an 
island economically viable by using outside resources would amount to creating a ‘semi-
artificial island’, and the granting of an EEZ and continental shelf to such an island is 
doubtful.37 Ma concludes by stating that, ‘the development of the rock’s indigenous resources 
must be economically feasible according to local standards at the time the question arises.’38 
                                                          
34 Ibid. 
35 Su (n 5), at p. 401. 
36 Ma (n 8), at p.  30. 
37 Ibid. Van Dyke, Morgan and Gurish support this interpretation when they refer to Article 60(8) of UNCLOS 
which provides that artificial islands shall not be entitled to a territorial sea or affect the delimitation of the 
territorial sea, the EEZ or the continental shelf. Citing as an obvious reason for Article 60(8), the 
discouragement of States from building artificial islands for the sole purpose of laying claim to extra ocean 
space and thus the surrounding resources, they argue that by analogy, Article 121(3) should be interpreted to 
discourage States from populating certain insular maritime features for the express purpose of laying claim to 
ocean resources. See J Van Dyke, J Morgan and J Gurish, ‘The Exclusive Economic Zone of the Northwestern 
12 
 
Regarding the sustenance of human habitation, Kwiatkowska and Soons are of the opinion 
that Article 121(3) should be understood to mean that the rock is incapable of being inhabited 
(that is, it is uninhabitable) rather than that it is presently uninhabited.39 Ma agrees that the 
plain meaning of the terms used in Article 121(3) shows that ‘uninhabitability’ rather than 
‘uninhabitedness’ is the intention of the provision.40 However, he raises salient questions such 
as: for how long should the island be able to sustain human habitation, weeks, months or 
years?41 Symmons is of a similar opinion when he states that the actual fact of habitation has 
not been required42 though habitation may provide the evidential basis for considering 
whether or not a particular rock is inhabitable.43 These views, it is submitted, are acceptable 
because Article 121(3) speaks of rocks which ‘cannot’ sustain human habitation, indicating 
capability, rather than rocks which ‘do not’ sustain human habitation. Regarding the quality 
of the island which may lead to a conclusion of habitability, Gidel states that the island 
should have ‘natural conditions’ that permit the ‘stable residence of organized groups of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Hawaiian Islands: When Do Uninhabited Islands Generate an EEZ?’ (1988) 25(3) San Diego Law Review 425-
494, at p. 438, footnote 71. 
38 Ma (n 8), at p. 30. 
39 Kwiatkowska and Soons (n 28), at p. 160. 
40 Ma (n 20), at p. 90. 
41 Ibid. 
42 C Symmons, The Maritime Zones of Islands in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 1979) 
50. 
43 Ibid., at p. 49. 
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human beings.’44 This definition, according to Gjetnes would require the presence of fresh 
water, cultivable soil, and possibly other resources.45 
Whether these two conditions are cumulative or not is another issue that has plagued the 
minds of scholars.46 For example, Charney argues that by employing the word, ‘or’, between 
human habitation and economic life, Article 121(3) presupposes that satisfaction of either of 
the conditions, rather than both conditions, is what is required.47 Van Dyke is of the opinion 
that the two conditions may be regarded a single concept.48 Similarly, Su analyses paragraph 
3 in such a way that he considers whether a rock has sufficient economic resources of its own 
to sustain human habitation; and Kwiatkowska and Soons ask the very important question of 
the possibility of considering the notion of economic life in isolation from population.49 In 
holding that it is perhaps preferable for the word ‘or’ to be interpreted as meaning ‘and’, 
Kwiatkowska and Soons refer to the fact that the provision on rocks represents a compromise 
between States which (at the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) 
supported a distinct categorisation of islands with different legal status attaching thereto and 
                                                          
44 B Gidel, Le droit international public de la mer (1934), at p. 684 translated into English and quoted in Van 
Dyke and Brooks (n 31), at p.284. 
45 M Gjetnes, ‘The Spratlys: Are They Rocks or Islands?’ (2001) 32(2) Ocean Development & International 
Law 191-204, at p.195. 
46 A Elferink, ‘Clarifying Article 121(3) of the Law of the Sea Convention: The Limits Set by the Nature of 
International Legal Processes’ (1998) 6 IBRU Boundary & Security Bulletin 58-68, at p.59; Kwiatkowska and 
Soons (n 28), at pp.163–165. 
47Charney (n 27), at  p. 863. 
48 Van Dyke and Bennett (n 28), at p. 79. 
49 Kwiatkowska and Soons (n 28), at p. 165. Tanaka similarly expresses the view that economic life and human 
habitation are ‘intimately intertwined’. Y Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (2nd edn, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2015) 66. 
14 
 
States which did not support any such differentiation. Therefore, interpreting the word ‘or’ 
disjunctively would defeat the aim of excluding certain types of islands from coming under 
the definition of rocks.50 Symmons, seemingly agreeing, points out that ‘often, this concept of 
“utility” or economic viability has been coupled with that of habitation/habitability….’51 This 
observation by Symmons is evident in Ma’s analysis where the latter argues that whether a 
rock is capable of sustaining human habitation would depend on the economic resources of 
the rock.52 
The next section analyses the South China Sea Tribunal’s interpretation of Article 121(3), 
comparing it to the views expressed in literature where appropriate. 
The South China Sea Arbitration Award 
The claims advanced by the Philippines in the South China Sea Arbitration may be 
categorised into three. The first claim concerns the interpretation of the ‘nine-dash’ line 
which China claims represents its historic rights to the South China Sea. The second set of 
claims relates to whether certain offshore features are low tide elevations, islands or rocks 
and on the basis of this, whether these offshore features should generate an EEZ and a 
continental shelf. The third set of claims concerns allegations of violations of UNCLOS 
relating to interference by China with certain rights of the Philippines in the South China Sea. 
This paper is concerned with the second category of claims. 
Regarding the second category of claims, the Philippines sought a declaration that the 
following high tide features, namely Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and 
                                                          
50 Kwiatkowska and Soons (n 28) at 163–64. 
51 Symmons (n 42) at p.51. 
52 Ma (n 8), at p.29. 
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Fiery Cross Reef do not generate any entitlement to an EEZ and a continental shelf.53 While 
the Philippines did not expressly ask that the Spratly Islands be declared as rocks, the 
Tribunal concluded that this was the inevitable prayer resulting from the Philippines’ 
submissions 5, 8 and 9 where it requested the Tribunal to declare that certain activities of 
China were being carried out illegally in its (the Philippines) EEZ. The Philippines had also 
advanced the position that ‘none of the features in the Spratlys—not even the largest among 
them—is capable of generating entitlement to an EEZ or a continental shelf.’54 In this regard, 
it argued that ‘[e]ven the largest features in the Spratlys – including Itu Aba, Thitu and West 
York, the last two of which are occupied by the Philippines – are very small and incapable of 
sustaining human habitation or economic life.’55 
Although China did not participate in the proceedings, it published a position paper where it 
stated that the Spratly Islands, known in China as Nansha Islands, comprise of different 
maritime features, all of which are under Chinese sovereignty.56 It further stated that ‘China's 
Nansha Islands is fully entitled to Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and 
Continental Shelf.’57 China did not, in its position paper, provide any evidence to support its 
claim that the Spratlys are fully entitled to an EEZ and a continental shelf. However, in a 
letter transmitted to the individual members of the Tribunal by the Chinese Ambassador on 3 
                                                          
53 See Submissions 3 and 7. In 4 and 6, the Philippines prayed the Tribunal to declare that certain other maritime 
features are low tide elevations. This paper is not concerned with low tide elevations. 
54 Memorial of the Philippines, South China Sea Arbitration, vol 1 (20 March 2014) at para. 5.96, available at 
https://files.pca-cpa.org/pcadocs/Memorial%20of%20the%20Philippines%20Volume%20I.pdf. 
55 Ibid., at para 1.47.  
56 People’s Republic of China, ‘Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the 
Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines’ (7 
December 2014), at para 20,  available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1368895.htm. 
57 Ibid., at para 21. 
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June 2016,58 China sought to explain, albeit skeletally, why the Nansha Islands (Spratly 
Islands) should be considered as islands rather than rocks. The letter contained a response by 
a Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson to a question on the status of Itu Aba Island (called 
Taiping Dao by the Chinese), the largest of the Spratly Islands which is currently being 
administered by Taiwan.  
The question had noted that experts and journalists who at the time recently visited Itu Aba 
reported that there was plenty fresh water and lush vegetation, the presence of medical, postal 
and energy generation facilities as well as a general and vibrant atmosphere on the island. In 
response, China (through its Foreign Ministry Spokesperson) reiterated China’s sovereignty 
over the Nansha Islands (which includes Itu Aba/Taiping Dao), stating that these islands are 
entitled to an EEZ and a continental shelf. It then proceeded to provide evidence of the island 
status of Itu Aba in these words: 
Over the history, Chinese fishermen have resided on Taiping Dao for years, 
working and living there, carrying out fishing activities, digging wells for 
fresh water, cultivating land and farming, building huts and temples, and 
raising livestock. The above activities are all manifestly recorded in Geng 
Lu Bu (Manual of Sea Routes) which was passed down from generation to 
generation among Chinese fishermen, as well as in many western navigation 
logs before the 1930s. The working and living practice of Chinese people on 
Taiping Dao fully proves that Taiping Dao is an “island” which is 
                                                          
58 South China Sea Arbitration Award (n 2), at para 100. 
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completely capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life of its 
own.59 
The Philippines responded to this by stating that China had provided no specific evidence, 
such as citing any specific text or documentation, to support its position that Itu Aba is an 
island and not a rock within the meaning of Article 121 of UNCLOS, and that the Geng Lu 
Bu (Manual of Sea Routes) was nothing more than a navigation guide for fishermen.60 As 
China did not participate in the proceedings, the Tribunal requested the Philippines to provide 
anthropological, historical, geographic and hydrographic information on the status of the 
disputed maritime features. It also consulted an independent technical expert to aid it in its 
analysis and decision on these maritime features.61 The Tribunal began by interpreting the 
different words and phrases that make up the text of Article 121 of UNCLOS in light of its 
object and purpose. It also considered the travaux preparatoires to aid in its interpretation. 
It should be stated at this point that some of the opinions expressed by scholars examined 
above are echoed in the Tribunal’s award. However, the award still raises questions about the 
clear categorisation of a maritime feature as an island or rock. McDorman had noted just 
before the rendering of the award that notwithstanding the guidance provided by Article 121, 
the actual categorisation of maritime features is fraught with uncertainty and debate.62 
Unfortunately, this position still holds true after the rendering of the award as will be shown 
                                                          
59 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s 
Remarks on Relevant Issue about Taiping Dao (3 June 2016), available at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1369189.shtml. 
60 South China Sea Arbitration Award (n 2), at para 101. 
61 Ibid., at paras 132-33. 
62 T McDorman, ‘An International Law Perspective on Insular Features (Islands) and Low-Tide Elevations in 
the South China Sea’ (2017) 32(2) IJMCL 298-315, at p. 300. 
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subsequently. This is not unconnected to the fact Article 121(3) was a ‘product of 
compromise and deliberate ambiguity.’63 
In this award, the Tribunal held that the two conditions in Article 121(3) are not cumulative; 
therefore, the satisfaction of one condition entitles a maritime feature to an EEZ and a 
continental shelf.64 This holding is in agreement with Charney’s position stated previously. 
Nevertheless, the Tribunal acknowledges that these two conditions are linked, often going 
hand in hand, since economic life should normally refer to the life and livelihoods of human 
populations that inhabit the offshore feature.65 Indeed, it is hard to conclude from the 
reasoning of the Tribunal that these two conditions are not cumulative as the Tribunal seemed 
to consider them as such in its assessment of the EEZ and continental shelf-generating 
capacity of the Spratly Islands, specifically, Itu Aba Island.66 This recognition of the link 
between human habitation and economic life accords with the positions of Van Dyke, Su, 
Symmons and Kwiatkowska and Soons stated above.  
In interpreting Article 121(3), the Tribunal held that the term, ‘cannot’, in ‘cannot sustain 
human habitation’ ‘indicates a concept of capacity’. ‘Human habitation’ was taken to mean a 
‘stable community of people’ who regard the island not merely as some temporary and 
transient residence but as their home,67 because in the opinion of the Tribunal, the 
requirement to sustain human habitation involves a qualitative element relating not merely to 
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survival on these features but to a conducive livelihood.68 The Tribunal further held that 
Article 121(3) excludes a dependence on outside supply.69 Thus, a feature that can only 
sustain human habitation by reliance on continued delivery of resources from outside must be 
taken as failing to meet the condition in Article 121(3).70 For the Tribunal, it is the natural 
ability of the maritime feature that counts. Therefore artificial modifications intended to boost 
the capability of a feature to sustain human habitation are excluded.71 This conclusion stands 
opposed to Charney’s casino example but is in agreement with the general views of other 
scholars presented above. Whomersley, however, questions the Tribunal’s reasoning here, 
arguing that if Article 121(3) indicates the capacity of a maritime feature to sustain human 
habitation, then how the feature carries out that support function should not be a relevant 
consideration.72  
Regarding ‘conducive livelihood’, the Tribunal did not give the phrase a clear definition. 
While the Tribunal acknowledged that conduciveness may mean different things in different 
cultures, it stated that some basic things must be present including food, shelter and water. 
The problem with these criteria for assessing conduciveness is that they are the same criteria 
for assessing survivability. Would this then not equate survival on a feature to conducive 
livelihood? But the Tribunal had held that a feature should support conducive livelihood 
rather than just survival. Concerning the Tribunal’s position that human habitation should not 
be transient, how is this supposed to be assessed? This is the same question that Ma posed 
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when he asked how long a feature should be able to sustain human habitation. While the 
Tribunal said this should not be transient, it is not clear whether ten, twenty or even a 
hundred years would be viewed as transient. Also, how can one decide with certainty now as 
to a feature’s ability to sustain human habitation in, for example, fifty years’ time? 
Consistent with the positions of Ma and Su stated above, the Tribunal removed from the 
scope of Article 121(3), maritime features whose economic activities depend entirely on 
outside resources or which are used primarily as an object for extracting resources without 
the involvement of a local population. Therefore, to satisfy the condition of ‘economic life of 
its own’, the economic activities in question must be oriented around the specific maritime 
feature itself, not being focused solely on the surrounding territorial sea.73 The basis for this 
conclusion can be seen from the fact of the Tribunal’s understanding that the purpose of 
Article 121(3) is to exclude certain maritime features from possessing an EEZ and a 
continental shelf ‘that would infringe on the entitlements generated by inhabited territory or 
on the area reserved for the common heritage of mankind’ when the only benefit to the State 
which holds title to such maritime feature is the provision of maritime resources.74 
Furthermore, if Article 121(3) is aimed at determining whether a feature should possess an 
EEZ and a continental shelf (which are zones over which States exercise sovereign rights for 
the purpose of exploring and exploiting its natural resources), it would amount to a circular 
and absurd argument for the resources of the EEZ and continental shelf to be considered a 
primary determinant in whether a feature should be entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf.75 
This position is understandable although it is not clear why the resources of the territorial sea 
may not be taken into account for the purpose of proving that a feature can have an economic 
                                                          
73 South China Sea Arbitration Award (n 2), at para 623. 
74 Ibid., at  para 624. 
75 Ibid., at para 502. 
21 
 
life of its own since the territorial sea may be regarded as part of the territory of a State, being 
subject to its sovereignty. 
In keeping with the Tribunal’s analysis, it assessed whether Itu Aba Island (representative of 
the Spratly Islands, being the largest high tide feature) had the capacity to sustain human 
habitation by considering the presence of potable water, vegetation and soil quality as well as 
the historic habitation of the Island. Regarding economic life of its own, the Tribunal 
considered the evidence of historic commercial activity on the Islands.  
Although it was accepted that the presence of potable water, naturally occurring vegetation 
and agriculture indicated the capacity of Itu Aba to support human habitation, the Tribunal 
nevertheless concluded that this capacity was ‘distinctly limited’76 ‘and that agriculture on Itu 
Aba would not suffice, on its own, to support a sizable population.’77 Consequently, Itu Aba 
was held to be a feature that cannot sustain human habitation.78  
It is not clear why the Tribunal’s conclusion is hinged on the size of the population that can 
be sustained on Itu Aba, especially as the term ‘sizable’ can be interpreted ambiguously and 
because paragraph 3 of Article 121 simply refers to the capacity to sustain human habitation, 
without more. In fact, the Tribunal expressly acknowledged that, ‘[o]n the basis of the 
evidence in the record, it appears to the Tribunal that the principal high-tide features in the 
Spratly islands are capable of enabling the survival of small groups of people.’79 Can a small 
group not satisfy the requirement of a stable and settled population who consider the island 
their home or must a group necessarily be large to satisfy this requirement? Should not the 
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conclusion have been that Itu Aba has the capacity to sustain human habitation? As the 
Tribunal stated, Itu Aba has 
 naturally occurring vegetation capable of providing shelter and the possibility of 
at least limited agriculture to supplement the food resources of the surrounding 
waters. The record indicates that small numbers of fishermen, mainly from 
Hainan, have historically been present on Itu Aba and the other more significant 
features and appear to have survived principally on the basis of the resources at 
hand.80 
Also, ‘sizable population’ indicates that the maritime feature should be large and not small. 
How can a small island support a sizable population? The Tribunal’s reasoning brings one to 
the realisation that small islands being awarded the status of islands within the meaning of 
Article 121 and therefore entitled to generate an EEZ and a continental shelf is improbable 
because the condition of supporting a ‘sizable population’ may be difficult to meet, even 
though the maritime feature possesses potable water and vegetation which cannot outrightly 
be dismissed as incapable of supporting human habitation. Incidentally, the Tribunal had 
stated that size is not dispositive of the status of a maritime feature as an island or rock and 
had been careful to support this assertion with the fact that during the negotiation of 
UNCLOS, the negotiators had rejected the prescription of size as determinative of the insular 
status of a maritime feature.81 The Tribunal had also referred to the ICJ decision in Nicaragua 
v Colombia where it was held that ‘international law does not prescribe any minimum size 
which a feature must possess in order to be considered an island.’82 This leads one to question 
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how the Tribunal’s decision accords with its position that size is not a relevant factor in itself 
in the determination of whether a maritime feature is an island or rock. 
Nevertheless, the requirement for the population to be sizable is useful for disallowing 
arguments that a maritime feature is an island because it is capable of sustaining only a small 
group, for example, 10 persons, as this may be an artificial way of getting around the 
criterion in Article 121. 
One may further question the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal regarding the capacity of 
Itu Aba to sustain human habitation. The Tribunal had noted that historic evidence of the use 
to which a maritime feature had been put was useful in making a determination in this regard. 
While Paik queries the use of historic evidence on the basis of the fact that it emphasises 
actual habitation rather than capacity to sustain habitation,83 it is arguable that the Tribunal 
was faced with evidence of actual habitation on Itu Aba in the past, which should almost 
naturally lead to a conclusion of Itu Aba’s capacity to sustain human habitation, yet refused 
to make this finding. The Tribunal’s position that Article 121(3) presupposes a settled 
community who regard the island as home was rather what influenced its holding. But the 
criterion of a settled community who live permanently on an island is questionable. As 
Nordquist and Phalen note, the award departs from the text of the Convention as there is 
nothing in the text of Article 121 to indicate the existence of such a criterion.84 For them, the 
fact that human habitation and economic life are being sustained on Itu Aba ‘establishes 
beyond any doubt that Itu Aba/Taiping is not merely a rock .... [but] objectively meets all 
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reasonably conceivable requirements for the definition of an “island” both with respect to 
interpretation and application of Article 121(3) of the Convention.’85 
Itu Aba was also held to have failed to satisfy the condition of sustaining economic life of its 
own. This conclusion was reached notwithstanding evidence that the island had been used for 
commercial purposes in the past, for a considerably long period of time, at least from 1919 to 
1945, and involved an established network of trade. As the nature of commercial activities on 
the island was mainly extractive in nature, depending on the territorial sea and external 
supplies, and for the benefit of people residing outside the island, it could not be said, 
according to the Tribunal, that Itu Aba sustained ‘economic life of its own.86 
If extractive activities are excluded from constituting ‘economic life of its own’, and if the 
presence of potable water, vegetation and agriculture only count when they can support a 
‘sizable population’, it is hard to understand the conclusion of the Tribunal that the conditions 
in Article 121(3) are not cumulative. This is because the major economic activity that can 
take place on such an island that may not be classed as extractive would be agriculture, yet 
this is qualified by the condition, ‘sizable population’. This definitely links the two 
conditions. Moreover, the Tribunal acknowledges that ‘economic life’ presupposes human 
presence to carry on this economic life.87 
Still on ‘economic life of its own’, the award does not convincingly show why certain 
activities should not count as economic life of a feature’s own. If a maritime feature is 
surrounded by water, fishing and other uses of the resources in the surrounding water would 
naturally be the economic activity of the inhabitants of the feature. It is not difficult to find 
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coastal communities engaged in fishing and allied activities as first choice, even when they 
have fertile land that can sustain agriculture. Why then should fishing in the territorial waters 
not be classed as economic activity of a maritime feature’s own? The same argument is 
applicable to commercial activities such as guano collecting and bird stuffing. If a feature 
naturally attracts birds and these birds can provide value which can be exploited 
economically, it should follow that such feature can sustain its own economic life. There is 
nothing inherently different between engaging in agricultural activities,88 which is in fact 
exploiting a natural resource, namely, the soil, and exploiting other natural resources such as 
fish. A landlocked State might engage in exportation of timber and products manufactured 
from timber. It would simply be using its resources in the same way that an island State or an 
island which is owned by a State would use the natural resources of the water. The water is 
usually the source of livelihood of the people living around it. As absurd as it would be to 
require a landlocked State to not exploit its timber resources, so it is when islands are not 
allowed to engage in fishing for the purpose of survival. Economic activities are generally 
shaped by the environment and the resources available. Indeed, Symmons notes that at the 
third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Pacific States, specifically Fiji, 
pointed out that certain remote islands had no viable land-based economy and ‘little prospect 
of economic development other than by expanding their fishing industry.’89  
Additionally, disqualifying activities such as guano collecting and bird stuffing which take 
place on the island itself on the ground that they are extractive does not seem to be based on 
the text of Article 121 or other provisions of UNCLOS, leading one to question whether the 
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Tribunal was actually giving the terms used in UNCLOS their ordinary meaning in their 
context and in light of the Convention’s object and purpose.90 
Another important question that arises from the Tribunal’s reasoning is whether there is a 
time element involved in deciding that a particular feature is an island or rock. (This is 
similar to the concept of critical time for the purpose of deciding title to territory.) This 
question is asked because some maritime features that are above water at high tide could 
have, in time past, used outside resources to create an economic life or sustain human 
habitation and therefore at the time of delimitation (whether bilaterally or through 
adjudication), there would be an established economic life or inhabitation which logically 
should lead to the conclusion that the maritime feature is an island, and not a rock. Should the 
criteria then be different because in another case, the island is uninhabited and although it is 
similar naturally to the first mentioned island, it has not brought in outside resources to 
establish its economic life or sustain human habitation? The only difference between these 
features is that in one, humans had used outside resources at an earlier time in history to 
establish a livelihood whereas in the second one, humans have only recently decided to do the 
same thing. This would seem to be a case of equity aiding the vigilant and not the indolent.  
The above issues raise questions that may make applying the award difficult in subsequent 
cases. Nevertheless, an attempt would be made to consider how the award may be applicable 
to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.  
Applying the South China Sea Arbitration Award to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island 
Dispute 
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In order to apply the decision of the Tribunal in the South China Sea Award to the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute, one must first consider physical evidence that proves or 
disproves that the Islands can sustain human habitation or economic life of their own. If this 
proves inconclusive, or to use the Tribunal’s words, a feature falls close to line, one may then 
consider the historic use to which the islands have previously been put.  
Regarding the first step, it is submitted that there is insufficient, publicly available physical 
evidence to categorically conclude that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands can support human 
habitation and/or that it can sustain an economic life of its own at the present.91 It has, 
however, been reported that the three of the largest Islands have vegetation, specifically palm 
trees and tropical bushes.92 Ma records the presence of the plant, statice arbuscula, a 
medicinal plant used for curing high blood pressure and rheumatism, on them. He notes the 
presence of potable water capable of sustaining at least 200 persons on the largest island, 
Diaoyu tai.93  Not only does this writer not have more detailed information on the agricultural 
capacity of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands or its ability to produce fresh water that can sustain 
human habitation, this writer acknowledges that the disputing parties—China and Japan—
may, if the need arises, present conflicting scientific evidence to support their different 
positions. In the South China Sea Arbitration, notwithstanding that China did not participate 
in the proceedings, there were conflicting positions presented on the capacity of Itu Aba to 
sustain human habitation. The Amicus Curiae Submission to the Tribunal by the Chinese 
(Taiwan) Society on International Law referred to scientific evidence that showed that Itu 
Aba is capable of sustaining human habitation. According to the submission, there are four 
groundwater wells operating on Itu Aba, with one of the wells, labelled well No 5, able to 
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provide drinking water for 1000-1500 persons per day.94 The submission also showed that the 
soil of Itu Aba is capable of supporting indigenous vegetation and agriculture and listed a 
number of vegetables and trees that grow on Itu Aba.95    The Taiwanese government, which 
administers Itu Aba, has also reiterated that the maritime feature can sustain human 
habitation.96  
The Philippines, on the other hand, sought to rely on materials that indicated the contrary 
position. Nevertheless, in responding to the Amicus Curiae Submission, the Philippines noted 
that there were indeed fruit trees growing on Itu Aba that served as food for persons on the 
feature in these words: ‘the landing party was given orders that “no one was allowed to pick 
the flowers, plants and fruits” so these could be “saved as food supplies for the officers 
stationed on the island”’.97 In the face of these conflicting positions, the Tribunal took its 
decision as stated above.98 The difficulty in predicting the Tribunal’s decision underscores 
the difficulty of stating firmly that the Diaoyu/Senkakus are indeed islands and not rocks. As 
the Islands are small, however, there is the possibility, if one were following the award, to 
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come to the conclusion that the islands cannot sustain human habitation since any such 
capacity would be distinctly limited. The Tribunal favoured a maritime feature that can 
support a sizable population, even though what is sizable is open to conflicting interpretations 
and there is no requirement for size in Article 121 of UNCLOS.  
This section now turns, as the Tribunal did, to consider the past habitation and economic life 
of the Islands in analysing the status to be awarded them. It is reported that around the 
beginning of the 20th century, a Japanese known as Tatsushiro Koga carried out economic 
activities on three islets of the group, namely Tiao-yu, Huang-wei,and Nan-hsiao. Koga brought 
in seasonal workers, food and supplies, and houses, warehouses and sewers were built. The 
soil was also cultivated, though Koga’s main business activities involved collecting guano 
and albatross feathers, bird stuffing and bonito fishing.99 The number of people who lived on 
these islets grew to more than 200 although it was difficult to recruit adults to move to the 
islets.100 A research project sponsored by the Japanese government states that the people who 
moved to the islets moved there not as settlers, but as temporary workers, and this is 
evidenced by the fact that there were no personal houses but functional buildings, including 
dormitories, for the workers.101 After the death of Koga, Koga’s son carried on the business 
but things declined and the inhabitants of the islets emigrated.  
                                                          
99 Ma (n 8), 31–32. 
100 Barbara Demick, ‘The Specks of Land at the Center of Japan-China Islands Dispute’ Los Angeles Times (24 
September 2012), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/24/world/la-fg-china-japan-islands-
20120925. 
101 Makomo Kuniyoshi, ‘The Senkaku Islands in the Context of the History of the Modern Fishing Industry in 
Okinawa’ 14, available at 
http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/digital_library/japan_s_territories/160414_Makomo_Kuniyoshi_.pdf. 
30 
 
This description resembles that of Itu Aba Island where temporary workers (numbers of 
which reportedly rose up to 600 in 1927) lived on the Island, and dormitories, offices, 
warehouses and a clinic was built. No stable community formed and all workers eventually 
left the Island.102 Fishing and guano collecting constituted the major business, which business 
naturally declined, not being truncated by intervening factors.103 The similarity between Itu 
Aba and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands indicates that the same conclusion reached in respect of 
the former may be reached in respect of the latter if the reasoning of the Tribunal is followed. 
Thus, while it may be argued that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are inhabitable in view of the 
fact that they were once inhabited and for a relatively considerable period, it may also be 
argued that this inhabitation was not sustainable which is evidenced by the emigration of the 
island inhabitants as well as the continued need, at the time, to replace them with new sets of 
inhabitants.104 This is a reminder of the Tribunal’s and Gidel’s ‘stable residence’ definition 
for habitability. The problem with siding with the Tribunal and Gidel is that the absence of a 
stable residence of inhabitants does not actually indicate that a feature is incapable of 
sustaining human habitation. Is the fact that only temporary dwellings were constructed 
useful for holding that a feature is unable to sustain human habitation? Is it not rather the case 
that the use of the maritime feature whether as a temporary dwelling or as a permanent one 
was a matter of choice? Why then is this choice determinant of whether a maritime feature is 
an island or not? The law speaks simply about a feature’s capability to sustain human 
habitation, not its capability to sustain a specific class of human beings, that is, temporary 
settlers or permanent settlers. In fact, the capability of a feature to sustain temporary 
inhabitants may be evidence that it can sustain permanent inhabitants.  
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Regarding economic life, while it clear that economic activities did take place on the islets, it 
may be argued that because Koga had to bring in supplies from outside, the islets cannot be 
spoken of as having the capacity to sustain an economic life ‘of its own’. Also, as gleaned 
from the Tribunal’s Award, the kind of economic activities engaged in on the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were primarily extractive, depending on the territorial sea and not 
oriented around the feature itself. Thus, ‘extractive economic activity, without the presence of 
a stable local community, necessarily falls short of constituting the economic life of the 
feature.’105 The failure of Koga’s family business and its non-revival since may also be 
presented as evidence of the ‘unfeasibility of establishing an indigenous economic life on the 
islets.’106 These arguments may be met with equally compelling arguments as noted above 
such as that the historic use by Koga is not conclusive of the island’s capacity or otherwise to 
sustain an economic life of its own. This is because (a) the decision to use the resources from 
the island to benefit outside populations was simply a matter of choice, a choice that could be 
altered at anytime to benefit a local population, (b) Article 121(3) speaks of capacity to 
sustain economic life of its own and the historic economic activities constitute evidence of 
such capacity and, (c) extractive activities such as fishing and guano collecting should be 
accepted in the assessment of the economic life of a feature’s own. 
While it may be difficult to conclude categorically that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island group be 
treated as rocks under Article 121(3) rather than as islands capable of generating an EEZ and 
a continental shelf, it seems more plausible, on the basis of the Tribunal’s award, that they 
are rocks and therefore would not be entitled to an EEZ and a continental shelf. Whether this 
award will impact on future decisions on Article 121(3) and on State practice is yet to be 
seen. The areas of dissatisfaction with the award identified in this paper may be such as 
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reduce the probative value of the award and may be highlighted in a future case for the 
purpose of convincing the adjudicator not to follow the award.107 
Conclusion 
The resolution of the East China Sea maritime boundary dispute between China and Japan 
necessarily involves the resolution of the question: whether the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
should be treated as rocks or islands under Article 121(3) of UNCLOS and what role they 
should play in the delimitation exercise. The award by the Tribunal in the South China Sea 
dispute accords with some of the views expressed in literature as to the interpretation of 
Article 121 of UNCLOS. However, the Award’s interpretation of Article 121(3) is not 
satisfactory. The issue of whether the criteria in Article 121(3) are cumulative or not has not 
been settled. While the Tribunal says they are not cumulative, its interpretation seems to 
indicate that they are. Other matters such as the role of size in determining the insular status 
of a feature and determining what constitutes economic life of a feature’s own or its capacity 
to sustain human habitation are still open for question. How the historical use to which a 
feature has been put impacts on its ability to satisfy Article 121(3) is also not settled as seen 
from the criticism of the award.  
Notwithstanding, it must be noted that the Tribunal’s difficulty is a product of the way in 
which Article 121(3) was drafted. The Tribunal had to give meaning to a provision that was 
‘poorly drafted’108 and that ‘raises considerable problems of definition and application’.109 It 
is similar to Article 83(1) of UNCLOS, the provision on delimitation of the continental shelf 
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that was consciously designed to achieve as little agreement as possible,110 leaving the task to 
the ICJ and tribunals to clothe it with substance.111 Charney had noted in this regard that in 
international maritime boundaries, the judgments of the ICJ and other tribunals take on great 
salience.112 As Article 121(3) had never been interpreted until the South China Sea 
Arbitration, it will be a reference point in future cases involving the classification of maritime 
features as either islands or rocks. Still, whether a maritime feature is an island or rock will 
have to be assessed on a case by case basis.113 
While the decision may not be easy to apply to cases where it is necessary to decide whether 
a particular feature is an island or rock, it is possible to apply it to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island 
dispute. This is because the history of use of the Island is similar to Itu Aba considered by the 
Tribunal. On the basis of the award then, the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are more likely to be 
classed as rocks and consequently, not entitled to generate an EEZ and a continental shelf.  
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